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EXPERTS AND THEIR TESTIMONY.
In answer to a very courteous request received by the writer
from His Honor Judge Endlich, the following attempted defi-
nitions of" expert" and "expert testimony" were submitted to
'him in February, 1897, with requests for his criticism :
Expert testimony may be defined as that which either rests
upon the application through reasoning of principles susceptible of
explanation and approved by persons of average intelligence; or is
based upon the personal experience of one who is more than ordi-
narily qualified to discriminate between similar impressions. Tes-
timony which does not fall under one of these two heads should not'
be admitted as expert testimony.
It is also to be noted that the weight of expert testimony is
proportional to the clearness with which the mental processes lead- -
ing to a given conclusion can be followed by the hearer. Where
this cannot be done, the whole force of the testimony depends upon
the belief in the witness's competency and honesty.
An expert is one skilled in a subject by observation or investi-
gation.
To which the judge replied, in part:
- . . The idea that, it seems to me, ought to be conveyed by
a definition of expert testimony would be that it "rests either upon
the application through reasoning of principles which are generally
recognized as controlling in any given science, art or trade, by
those who are practically or theoretically, or both practically and
theoretically, conversant with the same; and which, while pre-
sumptively beyond the common knowledge of men, are yet sus-
,ceptible of explanation to and approved by persons of average
intelligence-or is based upon personal experience, etc." . . . In
174 Pa. 298, Judge Williams says: " . . . An expert witness is one
who, because of the possession of knowledge not within ordinary
reach, is specially qualified to speak upon the subject to which his
attention is called." Possibly, a combination of the essential
thoughts expressed in your definition and that of Judge Williams
might result in something more nearly perfect than we have yet
had. . . . I believe, with you, in retaining so much of 'the
present system as puts the selection of expert witnesses (at least in
the first instance) into the hands of the parties. I don't think,
however, that they ought to be at liberty to call as many as they
please-but only a reasonable number. . . . Your division of
experts and their testimony into subjective and objective, and your
notice of the blending of the two, are very good, indeed. . ..
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In consequence of this first failure a second effort was made-
as subjoined, and this was submitted to several gentlemen of-
the Pennsylvania Bar, of whose comments brief condensations
here follow.
The words in brackets were stricken out by Judge Endlich.
I. Expert. An expert is one who by greater power of dis-
cernment than ordinary men [either as a gift of nature, or] by
reason of a greater number of previous experiences, is better
able than they to elucidate a given question by observation or
investigation.
II. Expert Testimony. Expert testimony is that given by
such a person, and is based upon his individual impressions
as to the facts. But in so far as it is possible for him to expose
to persons of average intelligence the successive inentalprocesse-
by means of which he attains his conclusions it is [shall be] his-
duty to do this: and such demonstration however easil , intelli-
gible when thus explained, if requiring more than ordinary
knowledge or skill to make it does not lose [shall not be held to
have lost] its character as expert testimony.
27 February, 1897.
• Scientifically, I think very highly of your definition. I
doubt, however, whether it would be accepted by the courts as a
definition of what, in law, is regarded as an " expert."
In legal thought I do not think the idea of "greater power of
discernment " enters. The man may start with the most ordinary
powers of discernment ; but if he can testify to a sufficient number
of previous experiences he will be admitted. The " greater power
of discernment" constitutes the great "expert;" but is not nec-
essary in law to an "expert."
So much for your definition. If you ask me to substitute a
better, I must decline. I am always ready to act as critic in
pointing out the defects of others; but I have become too much of
an "expert" in the ways of the world to expose my own con -
structions to the criticisms of others. I am,
Very sincerely yours,
JOHN G. JOHNSON.
Mr. Samuel Dickson substitutes the following:
March 1, 1897.
Expert. One having such special knowledge as to make his,
opinion a reasonable ground of belief.
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Expert Testimonzy. The opinion of an expert upon facts proven
or stated hypothetically. In so far as it is possible for him to
(re)state the mental processes or experimental methods by which
he has reached his conclusion, it shall be his duty to do so.
The second attempt at definitions having been forwarded
to Judge Endlich, together with the comments of Mr. Johnson
and Mr. Dickson, His Honor replied as fQollows:
March 4, x897.
I still prefer your definition of "expert " as it stands on
the slip inclosed by you. The "greater power of discernment"
Mr. Johnson objects to is, I think, all right in association with the
succeeding phrase, "by reason of a greater number of experiences."
His criticism is virtually the same as that which I made upon the
words "as a gift of nature." As he says, it is the previous ex-
perience that qualifies a man as an expert. Even tea-tasters,
artists, and the like, are accepted as experts, not because they have
naturally acute perceptions or genius in their lines, but because they
are tea-tasters, artists, etc.-because that is their business or pro-
fession, or because they have made studies or experiments in those
matters-all of which implies experience. But, after all, the ulti-
mate reason why the latter is admitted as a basis of qualification to
give opinion evidence is this, that such experience may be presumed
to have imparted a greater power of discernment in a particular
branch of knowledge, etc., than ordinary men can possess. It is
the ignoring of this latter element, which is a condition precedent
to the admissibility of expert testimony, (viz., the subject must be
one beyond the presumptive capacity of the ordinary man,) that
would seem to constitute a well founded objection to Mr. Dickson's
definition. If after the word "knowledge" were inserted some-
thing like this: "on a subject beyond the presumptive grasp of
ordinary man," his definition of "expert testimony" is one which
suggests no need of improvement to my mind. . .
Mr. George Wharton Pepper, under date of April 12, 1897,
says :
If, from the statements of facts made by witnesses, or
from an inspection of inanimate objects produced, one, upon the
basis of special experience, is able to establish a premise * material
to the conclusion of the suit, which premise * persons without the
special equipment could not establish-then in virtue of his ability
to establish that premise * he is an expert, and his testimony is
expert testimony. I would accordingly attack the problem with
which you are dealing by endeavoring to define "expert testimony"
rather than the term "expert "-since the law on this head has
tended to develop a theory of testinony rather than a theory of
* Conclusion (?). P. F.
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-witnesses. I would then define testimony and expert testimony
somewhat as follows:
I. Testimony consists of the stating of facts or the production of
objects, under certain guarantees of truth and genuineness, from the
hearing of which statements or from the examination of which
objects an inference may be drawn as to the existence or non-
existence of a fact in issue or of a fact relevant to the issue. The
person who states the facts or identifies the object is called the
witness.
II. When the process of inference requires no other equipment
than the education and experience necessary for the conduct of the
ordinary affairs of life, the inference must be drawn by the jury.
III. When from facts stated or objects produced, a relevant
inference may be drawn, but where the drawing of it involves such
knowledge in a given sphere as results only from special study or
unusual experience, the inference in such case must be drawn, not
by the jury, but by one who has pursued the study or who has had
the experience. The explanation of the process of inferring and
the statement of the conclusion is called expert testimony, and the
witness is called an expert witness.
IV. Expert testimony accordingly results in furnishing the jury
with a new fact to serve as a new premise from which the jury may
draw its conclusions, as in other cases. It follows that expert testi-
mony may involve either (i) the drawing of inferences from facts
which would be admissible in evidence even in the absence of expert
testimony, because from such facts the jury might draw a partial
inference, or (2) the drawing of an inference from facts which
would have no significance for the jury at all in the absence of
expert testimony, and are therefore admissible only for the purpose
of laying ground for the testimony of an expert..
Mr. John Douglass Brown, Jr., under date of November
18, 1897, says:
. . . When the judge is satisfied that the witness offered is
entitled to express an opinion which the jury may properly consider
in reaching their verdict, it is permitted to counsel to examine him
and to opposing counsel to cross-examine him as to his knowledge,
experience and methods, It may seem as though this were prac-
tically the same thing as requiring the expert to prove his conclu-
sions worthy of belief by justifying the methods which he has
employed, which I take it is the underlying thought of your defini-
tion ; but there is certainly a distinction. You would seek to make
the expert demonstrate his position and consider his opinion of
very little importance unless he could demonstrate its soundness to
the jury; while the law, on the other hand, says that the judge may
say to the jury, "the opinion of this witness on the point involved
is a fact of sufficient importance for you to consider in reaching
your verdict, and the counsel who offered him may examine him as
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to his knowledge, experience and methods of work, and the counsel
who are on the other side may cross-examine him on the same
points, after which you are to determine what you think his opinion
to be worth."
This is what I understand the law to hold in regard to experts.
It is difficult to frame a definition ; but I suggest the following,
which I believe is accurate :
"An expert is one who, when a matter in dispute is to be deter-
mined by a science or an art, the mastery of which requires special
study, or by knowledge derived from particular application to a
specialized occupation, is believed by the court to possess such
experience as to make his opinion on the matter in dispute, a fact
properly to be considered by the jury in reaching a .conclusion
thereon."
"Expert testimony may be supported or assailed by examining
or cross-examining the expert as to the extent of his experience and
the methods employed by him in arriving at his opinion, and the
weight of his testimony is to be determined by the jury..
Expert Testimony.
It may be assumed that the object of all public institutions is
the good of the community, and that there is a gradual approach
by means of progress and change towards greater perfection;
and that the sole aim of those who are considering this question
is to secure a better utilization of a part of the world's power-
for the attainment of a larger measure of good for the world's
benefit. Any power may be misdirected and rendered harmfiul.
It is the purpose of those who are giving their time to this
subject, to curtail as much as possible the opportunities for
the abuse of the power of expert testimony, and to enlarge
the field in which it can act only as an aid to the elucidation
of truth and to the accomplishment of justice.
There are two principal theoretical points of view from which
it may be regarded: that of the jurist, and that of the expert
himself; the former, of course, of greatly preponderating
importance, and both subservient to the practical necessities of
the public, in whose interest the study is undertaken.
In reality, the expert has only the right to demand that the
practice shall enable him to give to the jury or the court, as it
may be, the facts as he finds them. He is not competent to
embody in the form of a law the restrictions under which
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expert testimony may be presented in court, although perfectly
competent to formulate the rules by which any expert work
should be judged by a body of scientific men.
The reason of this is obvious. The common law which has
been found on the whole to yield such good results in the
hands of the Anglo-Saxon race, has grown like the palace of
St. 'Mark by successive additions and patches. Much of its
structure is composed of conventional usages and interpreta-
tions of which the lay mind is ignorant, and yet these parts
have a strength, like that of a " built-up-beam," as great as
similar parts of a brand new code expressed in modern
English, and which is the ideal of the practical man.
There would be great danger in allowing one, ignorant of
the history of the law and the significance of its formulas to
insert a new part among its venerable timbers, lest some of
the strongest spikes that bind the latter together should be
displaced, and the whole structure crumble.
Exclusively to the juris-consults, therefore, belongs the task
of formulating the law governing the presentation of expert
testimony, and if they have graciously invited experts to
participate in their deliberations it is in order that the rights of
the latter may be fairly safe-guarded in the new provisions.
The writer disclaims any pretension of being able to suggest
the proper form for a new patch on the old common law. If
the question were on the adoption of a new code to replace
the old, the limitations of a layman, whether expert or not,
would be very much less. This conviction has been forced
upon him while trying to find a definition of expert, and
expert testimony, which would satisfy both jurist and scientific
man.
The statement of the various steps in this effort will well
illustrate the difficulty alluded to. The object was to find
such a definition for" expert " witness as to exclude charlatans,
and those who qualified themselves for the expert class recog-
nized by the present law, in order to be able to sell testimony
to the first applicant for their services.
If such a problem were presented to the consideration of a
body of scientific men the first thought would be to require
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from the witness a minute and circumstantial statement of the
various facts or postulates on which the investigation was
based; how and where they were obtained; and the succes-
sive steps of reasoning by which the conclusions were reached.
The most unblushing perjurer could not stand this test; for
either his testimony would have real value, or the errors in
his facts, reasoning, or method would become apparent.
But, after carefully considering the language in which these
limitations of an expcrt was expressed, the writer learned with
dismay that under the existing law this definition would
exclude from the category of experts any one to whom it
applied, for the reason that the jury is supposed to be able to
take all necessary ratiocinative steps as well as those skilled
in special subjects.
The difficulty to the lay mind in comprehending this fiction
of the law is that obviously, even to the most superficial
observer, the greatest geniuses attain their highest fame, not
so much by giving to the world what was beyond the reach
of others, as by following the obscure path of consequences
from a region well known, to an eminence hitherto unscaled.
In other words, a large majority of the most important
additions to human knowledge consists in a demonstration of
the consequences which must follow from the existence of
several isolated, but well known facts. The putting together
of these facts in a manner to show their mutual relationship
and the support they give to a hitherto unsuspected conclusion,
is, as exclusively confined to original and master minds, and
is as essential to the welfare of mankind, as any of the results
of original research.
Can there be no expert in mathematics, or in mechanical
astronomy? Would Kepler, Newton and LaPlace have failed
to secure this title? Yet they only put well-known facts into
new relations to each other, thereby erecting new structures
of old material; from which, however, immensely enlarged
views of Nature were obtained. Would it be improper to call
Blackstone and Coke and Kent experts in the profession they
adorned? Yet, presumably, any jury of twelve men could
have looked up the authorities and written the commentaries
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which, after all, are only the perfection of human reason-and
therefore the every-day tools of the juryman.
It would seem from this that, in the present state of the law,
not only is preference given to ex-cathedra utterances, without
further support than the " experience" of the witness, but
actually the term expert is confined to one who has practiced
the profession, or engaged in the pursuit in which the facts
testified to are observed; or has been accepted previously by
other courts as an " expert" on kindred subjects, no matter
what his capacity may be. This method of selecting experts
is good only so long as the honorable character of the witness
is beyond question. On the other hand, it throws open the
door to any dishonest person who may wish to earn a living
by " experting; " and it is this ancient relic of a period ante-
dating the precise methods of modern science which is respon-
sible for the abuses of expert testimony complained of by
many learned jurists to-day. As long as this antiquated view
of experts endures, it is difficult to see how the canker can be
eradicated.
Two courses are open; the one which, naturally, suggests
itself to the non-legal mind, unhampered by too much
experience, is to abandon the old fashioned notion of an
expert, as an impediment in the way, and a useless anachron-
ism. To such a mind it seems that there would be no greater
shock to the fabric of the law by this procedure than occurred
when modern civilization demanded the removal of the un-
natural restrictions on the liberty of women. Inasmuch as
all existing institutions, and especially the common law, are
compromises, in process of continual change, say these
innovators, why perpetuate this obsolete conception after
it has become a fetter and a nuisance? Iconoclasts of this
type do not consider the consequences of such a change, nor
the difficulties in bringing it about without confusion and
injury to private interests in a congeries of communities, each
of which is more or less affected by the administration of the
law in all the others.
It is not within the writer's province to specify the objections
to this method of solving the difficulty, which is that which
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he would naturally be inclined to prefer, but he can see that
there may be many and grave objections to it.
The other course is that proposed by Judge Endlich in his
able and instructive paper on Expert Testimony, read before
the Pennsylvania Bar Association at its Water Gap Meeting,
July, 1898. In the sketch of proposed amendments accom-
panying this paper, Judge Endlich endeavors to introduce
restrictions into the several provinces of expert testimony,
rather than to change the fundamental idea of " expert," for
the purpose of minimizing venality and incompetency.
It is as if he left untouched the venerable gate, consecrated
by centuries of English practice, through which expert witnesses
have hitherto entered the courts of our ancestors, but fenced
around the preserves over which they have been hitherto
accustomed to roam at will; providing at each a wicket which
only those specially qualified can pass.
The advantage of this method is that it leaves unimperiled
the sacred palladium of the rights and liberties of generations
of Anglo-Saxons (which, like the sacred British inch, is
believed by many worthy people to have divine origin, and to
have been specially created for a favored people).
The disadvantage is that it requires special and complex con-
struction to accomplish what a simple, if radical, device would
better effect. Moreover, as in all cases where many smaller
parts are employed to accomplish the object which might be
attained by one larger, it is occasionally liable to fail in its
design by excluding what should be admitted; and, owing to
its lesser power of resistance, admitting what it was intended
to exclude.
Restrictions are useful only for a class which is not actuated
by high principle. To this class it is easy to gain admittance to
the witness stand by misstatement or distortion of facts. The
most desirable class is, of course, the most conscientious,
and one which would frankly avow its ineligibility under some
minor or unimportant part of the strictly construed rule of
qualification.
In the first section of the changes suggested by Judge
Endlich, which is concerned with the qualifications of those
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who shall be eligible to testify as experts, it is possible to-
imagine a case of hardship where a desirable expert witness
would be excluded because not properly belonging to either
of the first four categories enumerated; but any scheme
less drastic than primary exclusion from the entire field must
now and then do some injustice.
Nevertheless, that Judge Endlich's plan would vastly
improve the class of experts before the courts of law of this
Commonwealth, and promote the only object of employing
them, i. e., the attainment of the truth, seems to one of the
humblest of those who have been recognized by the courts as
belonging to this much abused class, very certain.
Persifor Frazer.
Philadelphia, September 22, 1898.
